Comparison Overview
Foxconn Czech Republic

Foxconn Czech Republic
U Zámečku 27, Pardubice, 53201, CZ
Last Update: 07/02/2026
Become a part of our multicultural Foxconn family, responsible for the production of technologies that are used around the world. There are no limits for us, join us! You can find more information about vacancies and job opportunities at prace.foxconn.cz. Foxconn is th...

Midea Group
6 Midea Avenue, Foshan, Guangdong, CN
Last Update: 24/09/2026
Midea Group aspires to the vision of “Bringing Great Innovations to Life”, upholding the Founders’ philosophy of creating a better life through technology. Midea Group has evolved into a global leading technology company specializing in six major businesses including Sm...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Foxconn Czech Republic







Midea Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Foxconn Czech Republic in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Midea Group in 2026.
Incident History - Foxconn Czech Republic (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Foxconn Czech Republic cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Midea Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Midea Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Foxconn Czech Republic

Midea Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.