Comparison Overview
Foxconn Slovakia

Foxconn Slovakia
Dolné Hony 29, Nitra, 94901, SK
Last Update: 01/03/2026
Foxconn Slovakia, part of Foxconn Technology Group is the world’s largest electronics manufacturer and producer of electrical products for leading global brands. Leveraging automated production processes, including top SMT technology, Foxconn Slovakia’s production portf...

Jabil
10800 Roosevelt Blvd N, St Petersburg, Florida, US, 33716
Last Update: 23/09/2026
At Jabil (NYSE: JBL), we are proud to be a trusted partner for the world's top brands, offering comprehensive engineering, supply chain, and manufacturing solutions. With over 50 years of experience across industries and a vast network of over 100 sites worldwide, Jabil...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Foxconn Slovakia







Jabil






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Foxconn Slovakia in 2026.
Incidents vs Appliances, Electrical, and Electronics Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Jabil in 2026.
Incident History - Foxconn Slovakia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Foxconn Slovakia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Jabil (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Jabil cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Foxconn Slovakia

Jabil
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.