Comparison Overview
TFG (The Foschini Group)

TFG (The Foschini Group)
340 Voortrekker Road, Cape Town, 7500, ZA
Last Update: 13/09/2026
TFG holds a diversified portfolio of speciality retail assets across various product categories and consumer segments. The Group has a portfolio of 35 leading retail brands, with over 4600 outlets in 23 countries on five continents, offering customers a variety of speci...

MediaMarktSaturn
Wankelstr. 5, Ingolstadt, Bavaria, DE, 85049
Last Update: 18/09/2026
MediaMarktSaturn Retail Group is Europe's leading retailer of consumer electronics and related services. As part of its strategic realignment, the company is evolving from a traditional product retailer to a solution-oriented omnichannel platform that integrates custome...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

TFG (The Foschini Group)







MediaMarktSaturn






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for TFG (The Foschini Group) in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MediaMarktSaturn in 2026.
Incident History - TFG (The Foschini Group) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
TFG (The Foschini Group) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - MediaMarktSaturn (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MediaMarktSaturn cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

TFG (The Foschini Group)

MediaMarktSaturn
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.