Comparison Overview
Swedish Armed Forces

Swedish Armed Forces
Lidingövägen 24, Stockholm, SE, 107 85
Last Update: 04/04/2026
The Swedish Armed Forces is one of the biggest authorities in Sweden and is headed by a Supreme Commander. The deputy leader of the authority is the Director General. As the only authority permitted to engage in armed combat, the Swedish Armed Forces are Sweden’s ult...

United States Department of War
Washington, DC, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
The mission of the Department of War is to provide military forces necessary to protect the security of our country. The U.S. military defends the homeland, deters adversaries, and builds security around the world by projecting U.S. influence and working with allies and...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Swedish Armed Forces







United States Department of War






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Armed Forces Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Swedish Armed Forces in 2026.
Incidents vs Armed Forces Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for United States Department of War in 2026.
Incident History - Swedish Armed Forces (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Swedish Armed Forces cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - United States Department of War (X = Date, Y = Severity)
United States Department of War cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Swedish Armed Forces

United States Department of War
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.