Comparison Overview
Flynn Group

Flynn Group
6200 Oak Tree Blvd, Independence, Ohio, US, 44131
Last Update: 10/09/2026
Flynn Group was founded by Greg Flynn in 1999 as a small operator and developer of Applebee’s restaurants in Washington State. It has grown over the years into the largest franchisee operator in the world, and one of the top 20 largest foodservice companies of any kind ...

Papa Johns
788 Circle 75 Pkwy SE, Atlanta, Georgia, US, 30339
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Papa Johns seeks people who have an entrepreneurial spirit and share our philosophy for success. Hands-on training, a clean and safe work environment, quality business practices, advancement opportunities and meaningful work combine to produce not only the best pizza, b...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Flynn Group







Papa Johns






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Restaurants Industry Avg (This Year)
Flynn Group has 92.31% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Restaurants Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Papa Johns in 2026.
Incident History - Flynn Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Flynn Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Papa Johns (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Papa Johns cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Flynn Group

Papa Johns
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.