Comparison Overview
Florida Risk Partners

Florida Risk Partners
PO Box 1731, Valrico, 33595-1731, US
Last Update: 13/07/2026
Florida Risk Partners is the next generation. By creating true partnerships with our clients and prospects, we will achieve mutual "true success". Florida Risk Partners, LLC is a Trusted Choice® Independent Insurance Agency and risk management firm domiciled in the G...

Suncorp Group
80 Ann St, Brisbane, 4000, AU
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Suncorp offers insurance products and services through some of Australia and New Zealand’s most recognised brands. Our purpose is to build futures and protect what matters – the focus of our company for more than 100 years. With the passion of our people, and our por...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Florida Risk Partners







Suncorp Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Florida Risk Partners in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Suncorp Group in 2026.
Incident History - Florida Risk Partners (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Florida Risk Partners cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Suncorp Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Suncorp Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Florida Risk Partners

Suncorp Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.