Comparison Overview
Flight Centre

Flight Centre
South Brisbane, Queensland, AU, 4101
Last Update: 30/03/2026
Flight Centre is your centre for travel, providing a one-stop-shop for flights, hotels, holidays, tours and more. For over 40 years we've delivered millions of amazing travel experiences for our customers. With over 35,000 years of experience between us, we remain pass...

Europcar Mobility Group
13 ter Boulevard Berthier, Paris, Île-de-France, FR, 75017
Last Update: 08/09/2026
Europcar Mobility Group is a global mobility player, with 75 years of mobility services expertise and a leading position in Europe. “We help to change the way you move” is what we stand for and brings us together. More than ever, we're committed to delivering simple, s...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Flight Centre







Europcar Mobility Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Travel Arrangements Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Flight Centre in 2026.
Incidents vs Travel Arrangements Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Europcar Mobility Group in 2026.
Incident History - Flight Centre (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Flight Centre cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Europcar Mobility Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Europcar Mobility Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Flight Centre

Europcar Mobility Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.