Comparison Overview
Find Great People | FGP

Find Great People | FGP
32 E Broad St, None, Greenville, South Carolina, US, 29601
Last Update: 04/04/2026
Find Great People (FGP) is a nationally recognized talent acquisition and human resources consulting firm. Our 3 G’s define who we are: Great, Growth, and Gratitude. As a company, we are focused on growth and grounded in gratitude, led by a purpose to find great people ...

Kelly
999 W Big Beaver Rd, Troy, Michigan, US, 48084
Last Update: 30/03/2026
We’ve been helping organizations find the people they need longer than any other company in the world. Since inventing the staffing industry in 1946, we have become experts in the many industries and markets we serve. With a network of suppliers and partners around the ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Find Great People | FGP







Kelly






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Find Great People | FGP in 2026.
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kelly in 2026.
Incident History - Find Great People | FGP (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Find Great People | FGP cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Kelly (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kelly cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Find Great People | FGP

Kelly
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.