Comparison Overview
Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss
Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss
Operation Center 1, Zürich, Zürich, 8058, CH
Last Update: 13/03/2026
The Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss is Switzerland's national weather service. We record and forecast the weather and climate in Switzerland and thus make a sustainable contribution to the well-being of the population and to the benefit of the e...
US Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W., Washington, 20548, US
Last Update: 30/03/2026
For more information about GAO, please visit www.gao.gov. General Information The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. Often called the "congressional watchdog," GAO investigates how the federal go...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss
US Government Accountability Office
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
US Government Accountability Office has 8.26% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - US Government Accountability Office (X = Date, Y = Severity)
US Government Accountability Office cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology MeteoSwiss
US Government Accountability Office
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
LibreChat is an enhanced ChatGPT clone that supports multiple AI providers. In versions up to and including 0.8.3, a shared-agent editor can delete file records through `DELETE /api/files` that the owner has reused across multiple agents. The deletion removes the file globally — not just from the shared agent — breaking the owner's other private agents that reference the same `file_id`. The private agent retains a stale `file_id` reference that no longer resolves. A shared-agent editor can destroy files that the owner uses across multiple agents. The owner's private agents — which the attacker has no access to — break silently with stale `file_id` references. This is a cross-agent integrity violation: editing access to one agent should not affect another. Version 0.8.4 contains a patch.
LibreChat is an enhanced ChatGPT clone that supports multiple AI providers. In versions up to and including 0.8.3, users with only `VIEW` access to an MCP server can retrieve the server's decrypted admin-managed secrets through `GET /api/mcp/servers` and `GET /api/mcp/servers/:serverName`. The returned config includes plaintext values for `apiKey.key` and `oauth.client_secret`. This allows viewers of a shared MCP server to exfiltrate the underlying provider credentials. Version 0.8..4 contains a patch. Other remediations include: never returning decrypted admin-managed secrets to non-owners; redacting apiKey.key and oauth.client_secret from all API responses consider returning only boolean presence indicators for secrets, similar to the auth-values route pattern; and, if owners need to edit configs without re-entering secrets, preserving secrets server-side and returning placeholders instead of plaintext.
When returning errors, functions in the net/textproto package would include its input as part of the error. This might allow an attacker to inject misleading content to errors that are printed or logged.
Decoding a maliciously-crafted MIME header containing many invalid encoded-words can consume excessive CPU.
alf.io is an open source ticket reservation system for conferences, trade shows, workshops, and meetups. Prior to version 2.0-M5-2606, the alf.io extension sandbox injects a fully-functional HTTP client (`simpleHttpClient`) into every extension script's scope. The `postFileAndSaveResponse()` method accepts an arbitrary filesystem path as its `file` parameter and reads the file contents using `new FileInputStream(file)` with no path validation, directory restriction, or allowlist. A malicious extension script can read any file accessible to the JVM process user and exfiltrate it to an attacker-controlled server via HTTP POST. Version 2.0-M5-2606 patches the issue.