Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (CISSYMFBIFOR1768715192)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) breach identified under incident ID CISSYMFBIFOR1768715192.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fbi, the number of followers: 936451, the industry type: Law Enforcement and the number of employees: 10118 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 750 and after the incident was 725 with a difference of -25 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and their customers.

On 12 March 2025, a cybersecurity incident called "Medusa Ransomware Surges, Targeting Critical Infrastructure with Double Extortion Tactics" came to light.

The Medusa ransomware operation, tracked by Symantec as *Spearwing*, has claimed nearly 400 victims since its emergence in January 2023, with attacks rising 42% between 2023 and 2024.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing Sensitive data stolen before encryption, plus an estimated financial loss of Ransoms ranging from $100,000 to $15 million.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

Overall, the incident is a reminder of why proactive monitoring and strong governance matter.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exploiting known vulnerabilities in public-facing applications, and microsoft Exchange Server, ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1709), Fortinet EMS (CVE-2023-48788) and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating initial access brokers (commonly use phishing). Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including powerShell commands (Base64-encoded to avoid detection), and living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques and User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating deploying remote management tools like SimpleHelp, AnyDesk, MeshAgent. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating remote management tools like SimpleHelp, AnyDesk, MeshAgent for persistence and Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating pDQ Deploy for lateral movement and payload delivery. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to disable antivirus and Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control (T1548.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating mimikatz for credential theft. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs (T1070.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating deleting PowerShell command histories, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including terminating endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, and bYOVD technique using KillAV, and Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location (T1036.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating legitimate remote access tools like ConnectWise, PsExec. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating mimikatz for credential theft. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating advanced IP Scanner, SoftPerfect Network Scanner for reconnaissance and Account Discovery: Domain Account (T1087.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating navicat for database access. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating psExec for lateral movement and Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating simpleHelp, AnyDesk, MeshAgent for persistence. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including sensitive data stolen before encryption, and navicat for database access. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating cloudflared for command-and-control (C2) evasion and Protocol Tunneling (T1572) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ligolo for command-and-control (C2) evasion. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including roboCopy and Rclone for data exfiltration, and double extortion tactics. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including data encryption as part of ransomware attack, and ransoms ranging from $100,000 to $15 million and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strain Medusa (Spearwing) encrypts networks. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.