Comparison Overview
FACC AG

FACC AG
Fischerstr. 9, Ried im Innkreis, A-4910, AT
Last Update: 20/03/2026
FACC is a worldwide leading aerospace company in design, development and production of aerospace technologies and advanced aircraft lightweight systems. Being the technology partner of all major manufacturers, FACC works together with its customers on developing solutio...

Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, 20591, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The FAA is on the leading edge of a new frontier in commercial space transportation, building the next generation (NextGen) of satellite-based navigation systems, and fostering the safe integration of unmanned aerial systems into our airspace. We can only dream of what ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

FACC AG







Federal Aviation Administration






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for FACC AG in 2026.
Incidents vs Aviation and Aerospace Component Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Federal Aviation Administration in 2026.
Incident History - FACC AG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
FACC AG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Federal Aviation Administration (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Federal Aviation Administration cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

FACC AG

Federal Aviation Administration
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.