Comparison Overview
F&G
F&G
801 Grand Ave, Des Moines, Iowa 50309, US
Last Update: 03/05/2026
Established in 1959, F&G is headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa, and offers unique life insurance and annuity solutions to meet individual financial security needs through a national network of financial professionals. Our products protect people across the United States....
Porto
Avenida Rio Branco, 1489, Sao Paulo, SP, BR, 01205-001
Last Update: 19/09/2026
A Porto é mais que uma seguradora, é um ecossistema de soluções de serviços de proteção com tecnologia embarcada, para melhorar e facilitar a experiência do cliente. Com mais de 70 anos de mercado, a atuação da companhia se concentra hoje em quatro pilares estratégicos ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
F&G
Porto
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for F&G in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Porto in 2026.
Incident History - F&G (X = Date, Y = Severity)
F&G cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Porto (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Porto cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
F&G
Porto
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.