Comparison Overview
MEDC International Trade Services

MEDC International Trade Services
N/A
Last Update: 17/12/2025
The MEDC Matchmaking expertise connects businesses with opportunities. To help open foreign markets, the MEDC has established offices in the Arab Gulf, Brazil, Canada, China, Europe and Mexico.

None at this time
104 Franklin Ave, Spartanburg, 29301, US
Last Update: 26/03/2026
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Compliance Ranges Comparison

MEDC International Trade Services







None at this time






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Import and Export Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MEDC International Trade Services in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Import and Export Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for None at this time in 2026.
Incident History - MEDC International Trade Services (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MEDC International Trade Services cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - None at this time (X = Date, Y = Severity)
None at this time cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

MEDC International Trade Services

None at this time
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.