Comparison Overview
Experian Data Quality

Experian Data Quality
1 Beacon St, Floor 33, Boston, Massachusetts, US, 02108
Last Update: 31/03/2026
We empower businesses with data they can trust. In a world powered by data, your company needs the right tools and resources to prosper. At Experian, we've helped countless businesses just like yours navigate the realm of digital acceleration with trusted data validati...

Groupon
600 W Chicago, Chicago, 60654, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Groupon is an experiences marketplace that brings people more ways to get the most out of their city or wherever they may be. By enabling real-time mobile commerce across local businesses, live events and travel destinations, Groupon helps people find and discover exper...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Experian Data Quality







Groupon






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Experian Data Quality in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Groupon in 2026.
Incident History - Experian Data Quality (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Experian Data Quality cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Groupon (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Groupon cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Experian Data Quality

Groupon
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.