Comparison Overview
Exmark Manufacturing Company

Exmark Manufacturing Company
2101 Ashland Avenue, Beatrice, 68310, US
Last Update: 15/02/2026
Exmark Manufacturing was incorporated in May 1982 as an independent manufacturer of Professional turf care equipment. Today, it is the leading manufacturer of commercial mowers for the landscape professional. In addition to designing, building and marketing quality tu...

FEMSA
Av. Gral. Anaya 601 Pte., Monterrey, 64410, MX
Last Update: 13/09/2026
FEMSA is a company that creates economic and social value through companies and institutions and strives to be the best employer and neighbor to the communities in which it operates. It participates in the retail industry through Proximity Americas Division operating OX...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Exmark Manufacturing Company







FEMSA






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Exmark Manufacturing Company in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for FEMSA in 2026.
Incident History - Exmark Manufacturing Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Exmark Manufacturing Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - FEMSA (X = Date, Y = Severity)
FEMSA cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Exmark Manufacturing Company

FEMSA
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.