Comparison Overview
ESA Clean Space
ESA Clean Space
ESA HEADQUARTERS, Paris Cedex 15, 75738, FR
Last Update: 10/03/2026
Clean Space aims to ensure a sustainable space industry for the terrestrial and space environments, by redefining how the space industry operates, increasing the competitiveness of European industry.
Sandia National Laboratories
PO Box 5800, Albuquerque, 87185, US
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Sandia National Laboratories is the nation’s premier DOE science and engineering lab for national security and technology innovation. Our team of scientists, engineers, researchers, and business specialists apply their knowledge and skill toward delivering cutting-edge ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
ESA Clean Space
Sandia National Laboratories
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ESA Clean Space in 2026.
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Sandia National Laboratories in 2026.
Incident History - ESA Clean Space (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ESA Clean Space cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Sandia National Laboratories (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Sandia National Laboratories cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
ESA Clean Space
Sandia National Laboratories
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A flaw has been found in OpenClaw up to 2026.9.5. Affected is the function createCanvasHostHandler of the file extensions/canvas/src/host/server.ts of the component Canvas Host Route. Executing a manipulation can lead to denial of service. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. Fix suggestion's "streaming/size-limit" was never shipped - latest 2026.9.5 still buffers the whole file via readFile() (src/canvas/serve.runtime.ts:17,114), unlike the sibling WS path which caps at 64KB. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure.
A security vulnerability has been detected in DLR-RM stable-baselines3 up to 2.9.0. This affects the function PPO.load/load_replay_buffer/VecNormalize.load of the file save_util.py. Such manipulation leads to deserialization. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. In v2.9.0 the PyTorch tensor load path is hardened (weights_only=True), but that hardening was later reverted on master via PR #1913 "Hotfix: revert loading with weights_only=True" [blocked] to fix PyTorch 1.13 compat - so even the one "safe" path is inconsistent across versions. #2281 was closed as a duplicate of #1831 since both are unsafe pickle deserialization - but #1831's fix (PR #41) only gated the Hugging Face Hub loader in the separate huggingface_sb3 package. This finding covers the core stable_baselines3 load APIs (PPO.load, load_replay_buffer, VecNormalize.load), which have no safe mode or gate and remained exploitable in v2.9.0 until the outstanding hardening (PR #2264) ships.
A vulnerability was detected in dmlc dgl up to 2.1.0. This impacts the function load_info/_read_torch_data of the file utils.py. Performing a manipulation of the argument path results in deserialization. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in piskvorky gensim up to 4.4.0. The impacted element is the function Load of the file gensim/utils.py of the component Model Loader. This manipulation of the argument fname causes deserialization. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. Maintainer closed #3663 same-day with no comment, PR, or fix; repo's last push (2025-11-01) predates the report, so the unsafe pickle.load in SaveLoad.load remains unguarded at develop HEAD.
A security flaw has been discovered in JusticeRage Manalyze 1.0.0. The affected element is the function PE::_parse_debug of the file manape/pe.cpp of the component PE Parser. The manipulation of the argument misc.Length results in integer underflow. The attack may be performed from remote. The patch is identified as 3e299685759f4f767088871de58c5d07f98ee382. A patch should be applied to remediate this issue.