Comparison Overview
Engineering Software Lab Serbia

Engineering Software Lab Serbia
Bul. Milutina Milankovica 17/b, Belgrade, Serbia, CS, 11000
Last Update: 25/03/2026
Engineering Software Lab is a member of Engineering Group, one of the main players in the field of digital transformation of public and private companies and organizations around the world. With around 14,000 professionals in over 80 offices spread across Europe, the U....

Carelon Global Solutions India
Indianapolis, Indianapolis, 46204, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
Carelon Global Solutions makes healthcare operations more practical, effective, and efficient. Our global team of more than 25K innovators drives growth, delivers exceptional support, and develops digital tools specifically for health plans, providers, and systems. Each...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Engineering Software Lab Serbia







Carelon Global Solutions India






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Engineering Software Lab Serbia in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Carelon Global Solutions India in 2026.
Incident History - Engineering Software Lab Serbia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Engineering Software Lab Serbia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Carelon Global Solutions India (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Carelon Global Solutions India cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Engineering Software Lab Serbia

Carelon Global Solutions India
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.