Comparison Overview
EMCOR Construction Services Midwest

EMCOR Construction Services Midwest
5128 West 79th Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, 46268, US
Last Update: 28/11/2025
Only EMCOR Construction Services (ECS) combines expertise, experience, selfperformance capabilities, national purchasing power, superior financial strength, and an outstanding safety record in a way that results in the highest level of facility performance possible. And...

STRABAG
Ortenburger Strasse 27, Spittal/Drau, 9800, AT
Last Update: 15/09/2026
At STRABAG around 86,000 people working on progress at more than 2,400 locations worldwide. Uniqueness and individual strengths characterise both our projects and each of us as individuals. Whether its building construction, civil engineering, road construction, undergr...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

EMCOR Construction Services Midwest







STRABAG






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for EMCOR Construction Services Midwest in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for STRABAG in 2026.
Incident History - EMCOR Construction Services Midwest (X = Date, Y = Severity)
EMCOR Construction Services Midwest cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - STRABAG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
STRABAG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

EMCOR Construction Services Midwest

STRABAG
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.