Comparison Overview
E-marine PJSC

E-marine PJSC
Etisalat Business Center, Dubai, 2020, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
E-marine PJSC, an ISO Certified Company has grown to become one of the market leaders in Submarine Cable Installation, Maintenance and Repair Services. E-marine offers its services in the field of Marine Project Management, Consultancy, Marine Route Survey, Cable Freigh...

Huawei
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Shenzhen, 518129, CN
Last Update: 06/09/2026
Huawei is a leading global provider of information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and smart devices. With integrated solutions across four key domains – telecom networks, IT, smart devices, and cloud services – we are committed to bringing digital to...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

E-marine PJSC







Huawei






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for E-marine PJSC in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
Huawei has 1.96% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - E-marine PJSC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
E-marine PJSC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Huawei (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Huawei cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

E-marine PJSC

Huawei
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.