Comparison Overview
Elevate Santander

Elevate Santander
N/A
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The elevate ecosystem is a Santander global initiative to transform leadership by promoting a new learning culture. Our offer is organised in different learning spaces that make up a living and constantly evolving ecosystem: formal programmes, synchronous sessions with...

Louisiana State University
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, la, US, 70803
Last Update: 02/04/2026
LSU is the flagship institution of Louisiana and is one of only 30 universities nationwide holding land-grant, sea-grant and space-grant status. Since 1860, LSU has served its region, the nation, and the world through extensive, multipurpose programs encompassing ins...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Elevate Santander







Louisiana State University






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Elevate Santander in 2026.
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Louisiana State University in 2026.
Incident History - Elevate Santander (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Elevate Santander cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Louisiana State University (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Louisiana State University cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Elevate Santander

Louisiana State University
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Requesting a user or organization profile page (`GET /{username}`) with an `Accept: application/rss+xml` or `Accept: application/atom+xml` header returned the owner's activity feed without the visibility check that the profile page and the `.rss` and `.atom` routes apply. Anonymous users, restricted users and non-members could confirm the existence of limited or private users and private organizations and read their profile details and public activity, also when `[other] ENABLE_FEED` was disabled. Activity in private repositories was not included.
The Gitea API endpoint for creating push mirrors (`POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/push_mirrors`) checked only whether mirroring was enabled and not the `[mirror] DISABLE_NEW_PUSH` setting that the web interface enforces. A repository administrator could therefore create new push mirrors on instances where the site administrator had disabled them. A push mirror pushes all refs of the repository to a remote chosen by the caller, on each commit or on a schedule.
The Gitea API endpoint `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/media/{filepath}` wrote files of up to 1 KiB that are stored directly in Git, not in LFS, to the response without the content type and disposition headers Gitea uses for user content. An HTML file committed to a repository was therefore rendered by the browser on the Gitea origin. A user who can push to a repository could run JavaScript in the session of a victim who opens the media URL and act with the victim's permissions.
With `[repository] FORCE_PRIVATE = true`, Gitea creates new repositories as private, but the post-receive hook still applied the `repo.private=false` push option to an empty repository created by push. Any user who can create repositories could make their new repository public in violation of the instance policy. The default configuration is not affected.
The Gitea push mirror API checked whether the repository owner, instead of the requesting user, may use local file system paths. On instances with `[security] IMPORT_LOCAL_PATHS = true`, a repository administrator who is not allowed to import local paths could add a push mirror to a local path on the server when the repository owner has that permission. Gitea then pushed the repository's refs into an existing Git repository at that path with the permissions of the Gitea process.