Comparison Overview
eLab Tech @ A.S. Watson

eLab Tech @ A.S. Watson
Via Tortona, 37, Milan, 20144, IT
Last Update: 27/02/2026
Welcome to A.S. Watson Technology department, eLab Tech Milan! WHO WE ARE eLab Tech is a centralised in-house digital team established in 2015 to offer support to the A.S. Watson's eCommerce business, and to enhance our presence on digital channels across Europe. THE ...

Colruyt Group
Edingensesteenweg 196, Halle, Flemish Region, BE, 1500
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Colruyt Group operates in the food and non-food distribution sector in Belgium, France and Luxembourg with more than 700 own stores and over 1.000 affiliated stores. In Belgium, this includes Colruyt Lowest Prices, Okay, Comarkt, Bio-Planet, Cru, Bike Republic, Zeb, Poi...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

eLab Tech @ A.S. Watson







Colruyt Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for eLab Tech @ A.S. Watson in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Colruyt Group in 2026.
Incident History - eLab Tech @ A.S. Watson (X = Date, Y = Severity)
eLab Tech @ A.S. Watson cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Colruyt Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Colruyt Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

eLab Tech @ A.S. Watson

Colruyt Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.