Comparison Overview
ECSI, A Global Payments Company

ECSI, A Global Payments Company
1200 Cherrington Pkwy, Suite 200, Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, US, 15108
Last Update: 07/08/2026
ECSI, a Global Payments company, provides a full range of customizable solutions in support of the entire lifecycle of higher education and post-graduation. With 50 years of experience, 1,750+ clients nationwide, and a 99.9% client retention rate, ECSI is the largest pr...

UNSW
Gate 9, High St Kensington 2052, Sydney, New South Wales (NSW), AU, 2052
Last Update: 02/04/2026
The University of New South Wales (UNSW) is one of Australia's leading research and teaching universities. Established in 1949, UNSW has expanded rapidly and now has more than 52,000 students, including more than 14,000 international students from over 130 different c...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ECSI, A Global Payments Company







UNSW






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ECSI, A Global Payments Company in 2026.
Incidents vs Higher Education Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for UNSW in 2026.
Incident History - ECSI, A Global Payments Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ECSI, A Global Payments Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - UNSW (X = Date, Y = Severity)
UNSW cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ECSI, A Global Payments Company

UNSW
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.