Comparison Overview
Edenred Payment Solutions

Edenred Payment Solutions
3 Sheldon Square, London, undefined, W2 6HY, GB
Last Update: 17/03/2026
Edenred Payment Solutions is a payment solutions provider, enabling its clients to offer digital banking, embedded finance and card-based solutions to its customers. Edenred Payment Solutions provide a suite of functional APIs that enable access to an ecosystem of conne...

L&T Finance
Plot no. 177, CST Road, Mumbai, 400 098, IN
Last Update: 04/04/2026
L&T Finance is one of the leading NBFCs offering a range of loans across Rural | Housing | Two-Wheeler | Personal & Business (SME) The company is promoted by Larsen and Toubro Ltd. (L&T), one of the largest conglomerates in India. LTF is publicly listed on both the exc...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Edenred Payment Solutions







L&T Finance






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Edenred Payment Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for L&T Finance in 2026.
Incident History - Edenred Payment Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Edenred Payment Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - L&T Finance (X = Date, Y = Severity)
L&T Finance cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Edenred Payment Solutions

L&T Finance
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
VaahCMS versions 2.0.0 through 2.3.4 contain a malicious obfuscated JavaScript payload embedded in the Blade template responsible for rendering security OTP emails, allowing remote attackers to execute unauthorized code in any browser that renders the affected email template with JavaScript enabled. The payload establishes a WebSocket connection to a hardcoded command-and-control endpoint, installs a password-field keylogger using MutationObserver to capture dynamically added inputs, scrapes WhatsApp Web DOM content, and accepts remote commands to redirect or overwrite the rendered page.
undici does not validate the type property of a duck-typed blob-like request body before using it as the Content-Type header on the HTTP/1.1 dispatcher. In undici before 6.28.0, from 7.0.0 up to before 7.29.0, and from 8.0.0 up to before 8.9.0, an application that passes a hand-rolled blob-like body (via request, stream, pipeline, or dispatch) whose type is derived from untrusted input allows an attacker to inject CRLF sequences and append arbitrary HTTP headers, potentially smuggling a second request past the upstream. Native Blob objects are safe because their constructor strips CRLF from the type, and fetch is unaffected because it validates headers, but ecosystem libraries that build duck-typed blob shapes from user input can reach the vulnerable path. This is the same defect class as CVE-2022-35948 and CVE-2026-1527, on a header sink that the earlier fixes did not cover. The issue is fixed in undici 6.28.0, 7.29.0, and 8.9.0.
undici's cache interceptor mishandles optional whitespace placed around the equals sign of a qualified no-cache or private Cache-Control directive. In undici from 7.0.0 up to before 7.29.0 and from 8.0.0 up to before 8.9.0, the parser either drops the directive or stores a field name with literal quote characters, so the cache decision fails to recognize the qualification and the response is stored. In shared-cache mode, this lets a response containing one user's authenticated data be served from cache to a later caller, including an unauthenticated one, when both requests resolve to the same cache key. It affects applications that enable the cache interceptor in shared mode, forward Authorization headers upstream, and receive cacheable responses with qualified directives padded with whitespace around the equals sign. This is the whitespace-around-equals variant that the fix for CVE-2026-9678 did not normalize, and it is fixed in undici 7.29.0 and 8.9.0.
kishan0725 Hospital Management System 4.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection in check_availability.php via the parameters emailid and email.
- https://github.com/um-dsp/TaintRadar/blob/main/sql_injection_cves/hospitalmanagementsystemproject/20250811-hospital-management-system-check_availability.php-email-sqli/20250811-hospital-management-system-check_availability.php-email-sqli.md
- https://github.com/um-dsp/TaintRadar/blob/main/sql_injection_cves/hospitalmanagementsystemproject/20250811-hospital-management-system-check_availability.php-emailid-sqli/20250811-hospital-management-system-check_availability.php-emailid-sqli.md
kishan0725 Hospital Management System 4.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection in /doctor/edit-patient.php?editid=1.