Comparison Overview
EcoWater Systems LLC

EcoWater Systems LLC
1890 Woodlane Dr, Woodbury, 55125, US
Last Update: 23/01/2026
Established in 1925, EcoWater Systems LLC is one of the world's largest manufacturers of residential water treatment systems. EcoWater Systems is a member of The Marmon Group, an international association of about 140 business units that operate independently within div...

Arçelik Türkiye
Karaağaç Caddesi, İstanbul, 34445, TR
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Arçelik Türkiye olarak, "Dünyaya Saygılı Dünyada Saygın" misyonuyla yola çıkıyoruz ve teknoloji, insan kaynağı ve üretim gücümüzü sürdürülebilir bir gelecek için kullanıyoruz. 1955 yılında başlayan yolculuğumuz bugün, 22 marka, 46 üretim tesisi, 55.000 çalışan ve 58 ül...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

EcoWater Systems LLC







Arçelik Türkiye






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for EcoWater Systems LLC in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Arçelik Türkiye in 2026.
Incident History - EcoWater Systems LLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
EcoWater Systems LLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Arçelik Türkiye (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Arçelik Türkiye cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

EcoWater Systems LLC

Arçelik Türkiye
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in David Lingren Media LIbrary Assistant allows Stored XSS. This issue affects Media LIbrary Assistant: from n/a through 3.39.
Missing Authorization vulnerability in Kings Plugins B2BKing allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects B2BKing: from n/a through 5.2.30.
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in PublishPress PublishPress Series allows Stored XSS. This issue affects PublishPress Series: from n/a through 2.17.0.
linuxfabrik-lib provides Python modules for database access, caching, shell execution, and API integrations, and Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins uses its shared testing helper across check plugins. Prior to linuxfabrik-lib 6.1.0 and Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins 7.0.0, lib.lftest.test() treated the first or second element of a --test CSV argument as a filesystem path and returned the file contents as simulated standard output or standard error without path confinement. The hidden but production-accessible --test argument was accepted by sudo-authorized plugins, so an attacker controlling the nagios or icinga account could use check-plugins/deb-updates/deb-updates with its default QUERY=1 to disclose every line of a root-readable file. Approximately 22 other plugins exposed filtered content or a root file existence and readability oracle through the same helper, while check-plugins/network-bonding/network-bonding and check-plugins/openstack-swift-stat/openstack-swift-stat had direct read paths that bypassed the helper. The library fix confines fixture reads to the invoking plugin's unit-test directory and refuses unsafe anchors, and the plugin fix routes the two bypasses through that helper. These issues are fixed in linuxfabrik-lib 6.1.0 and Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins 7.0.0.
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/lib/commit/d665042c55fae83a295ebc0023e8b77f6c473a28
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/lib/releases/tag/v6.1.0
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/commit/f6680a9e4b39569f318feefdb2f51e5d18c7dad5
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/releases/tag/v7.0.0
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/security/advisories/GHSA-rh9c-rqvg-f7pr
Linuxfabrik Monitoring Plugins provides monitoring plugins for Icinga, Nagios, and related systems. Prior to version 7.0.0, check-plugins/logfile/logfile accepted a free-form --filename path and opened it as root when invoked through the shipped nagios or icinga sudoers allowlist, without confining the resolved path to /var/log. An attacker who controls the monitoring account can select a root-readable file such as /etc/shadow and use --warning-regex . while leaving SUPPRESS_OUTPUT false, causing each nonempty line to be collected in warn_matches and returned through lib.base.oao(). The vulnerable flow passes the expanded scan_path directly to open(), and neither real-path containment nor an allowlist protects the sink. The same fix also confines mysql-logfile and openvpn-client-list paths, allows only documented log roots, and resolves symlinks and parent-directory traversal before checking containment. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.0.
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/blob/ae486fc629e1ca9373e1b6dd5e395603ee453bbc/CHANGELOG.md#v700---2026-08-14
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/commit/a0ca1268d84e0caf10442b9c7477d699b52d1c92
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/releases/tag/v7.0.0
- https://github.com/Linuxfabrik/monitoring-plugins/security/advisories/GHSA-f54c-p5vg-mr5c