Comparison Overview
Econocom Morocco

Econocom Morocco
Econocom Maroc, Technopolis, Bâtiment B1 Sala-AL-Jadida Rabat 11 100, 1er étage, société Econocom. salé, rabat 11 100, Salé 11100، المغرب, Maroc, Rabat , Technopolis, MA
Last Update: 30/04/2026
Le groupe Econocom, fondé il y a 50 ans, a été un pionnier dans l’accompagnement des entreprises dans leur transformation numérique. Econocom fournit, finance et assure des services managés pour les espaces de travail, l'audiovisuel et les infrastructures. Cela inclut ...

Reply
C.so Francia, 110, Turin, 10143, IT
Last Update: 09/09/2026
Reply [EXM, STAR: REY] specialises in the design and implementation of solutions based on new communication channels and digital media. As a network of highly specialised companies, Reply defines and develops business models enabled by the new models of AI, big data, cl...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Econocom Morocco







Reply






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Econocom Morocco in 2026.
Incidents vs IT Services and IT Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Reply in 2026.
Incident History - Econocom Morocco (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Econocom Morocco cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Reply (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Reply cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Econocom Morocco

Reply
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in Rizwan17 inventory-management-system up to bfe78a330d01bb26b9daec5dc9ecd5c77900e03f. This affects an unknown part of the file includes/invoice_bill.php of the component Invoice Generation. Such manipulation of the argument order_date/invoice_no leads to missing authentication. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. This product takes the approach of rolling releases to provide continious delivery. Therefore, version details for affected and updated releases are not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in Rizwan17 inventory-management-system up to bfe78a330d01bb26b9daec5dc9ecd5c77900e03f. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file includes/DBOperation.php of the component List Handler. This manipulation of the argument category_name/brand_name/product_name causes cross site scripting. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Authentication Bypass via Hardcoded Master Verification Code vulnerability in Siam Ordering (siam-server) 1.0.0 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to log in as any user, merchant, or administrator.
The Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP receive handler bt_l2cap_br_recv() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c dispatched inbound data PDUs based only on the destination channel ID, without checking that the target channel had reached the BT_L2CAP_CONNECTED state. A dynamic channel is assigned its RX CID and added to the connection's channel list while still in BT_L2CAP_CONNECTING (and later BT_L2CAP_CONFIG) — before configuration completes and, for PSMs that require security, before the peer is authenticated (l2cap_br_conn_req()). Because the channel is already findable by bt_l2cap_br_lookup_rx_cid() during this window, a remote peer within radio range can send a data PDU addressed to that CID and have it processed on a not-yet-established channel. The dispatch keys off channel fields (BR_CHAN(chan)->rx.mode, rx.mps) that are only initialized during configuration by l2cap_br_conf(); since channel objects are pooled and bt_l2cap_br_chan_del() does not reset rx.mode or the reassembly buffer _sdu, a reused channel can carry stale state into the CONNECTING window and route the frame into the retransmission/flow-control path (bt_l2cap_br_ret_fc_recv()) with stale parameters and a possibly stale _sdu pointer. The impact is delivery of attacker data to upper-layer protocol handlers on a half-open (and possibly unauthenticated) channel, plus operation on stale or partially initialized channel state on reused channel objects — leading to channel/link teardown (denial of service) and, in the stale-_sdu case, a dangling-pointer condition. The fix adds an explicit BR_CHAN(chan)->state < BT_L2CAP_CONNECTED guard that drops any data received before the channel is fully connected.
Pandora contains a path traversal vulnerability in its archive extraction worker. When processing a specially crafted archive or disk image, attacker-controlled file paths could be used without ensuring that the resulting destination remained within the intended extraction directory. An attacker able to submit a malicious file for analysis could use path traversal sequences or crafted paths to cause extracted content to be written outside the designated extraction directory, potentially overwriting files accessible to the Pandora worker process. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized modification of application or system files, denial of service, and potentially further compromise depending on the permissions of the Pandora process and the files that can be overwritten. The vulnerability is addressed by resolving each extraction destination path before writing and verifying that it remains below the expected extraction directory. Extraction attempts resolving outside this directory are rejected and reported as path traversal attempts.