Comparison Overview
Echo Electric (formerly Richards Electric)

Echo Electric (formerly Richards Electric)
4620 Reading Rd, Cincinnati, Ohio, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Richards Electric has been helping its customers power homes, businesses and cities by supplying quality electrical products and exceptional customer service ever since Richard Misrach opened the company's doors in 1937. Over eighty years later, Richards maintains the s...

Ferguson
751 Lakefront Commons, Newport News, Virginia, US, 23606
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Since 1953, Ferguson has been a leading source of quality supplies for a variety of industries. We are proud to provide world-class products and services to a customer base that is as vast and varied as our inventory. The professionals we serve help transform the world ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Echo Electric (formerly Richards Electric)







Ferguson






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Echo Electric (formerly Richards Electric) in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ferguson in 2026.
Incident History - Echo Electric (formerly Richards Electric) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Echo Electric (formerly Richards Electric) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Ferguson (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ferguson cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Echo Electric (formerly Richards Electric)

Ferguson
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.