Comparison Overview
easyJet

easyJet
Hangar 89, London Luton Airport, GB, LU2 9PF
Last Update: 03/09/2026
We’re on a mission to make low-cost travel easy. Whatever your role, you’ll connect millions of people to what they love using Europe’s best airline network, great value fares, and friendly service. And to help us get there we’ll give you everything you need to make a ...

Qantas
10 Bourke Road, Mascot, 2020, AU
Last Update: 03/09/2026
We would like to acknowledge the Traditional Custodians of the local lands and waterways on which we live, work and fly. We pay our respects to Elders past and present. Spirit is everything to us, and joining the Qantas team means bringing your spirit to ours. We have...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

easyJet







Qantas






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Airlines and Aviation Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for easyJet in 2026.
Incidents vs Airlines and Aviation Industry Avg (This Year)
Qantas has 94.17% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - easyJet (X = Date, Y = Severity)
easyJet cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Qantas (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Qantas cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

easyJet

Qantas
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.