Comparison Overview
E15 Group

E15 Group
980 N. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, 60611, US
Last Update: 21/04/2026
E15 delivers next-generation insights based on data, not hunches. Our team brings unmatched industry intelligence and cutting edge analytics to professional & collegiate sports, entertainment, education, healthcare, hospitality, and retail to help companies make forward...

Technical University of Munich
Arcisstraße 21, München, Munich, Bavaria, DE, 80333
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Our university combines top-class facilities for cutting-edge research with unique learning opportunities for 52,000 students. Whether our researchers are investigating the origins of life, matter and the universe or looking for solutions to the major challenges for our...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

E15 Group







Technical University of Munich






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Research Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for E15 Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Research Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Technical University of Munich in 2026.
Incident History - E15 Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
E15 Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Technical University of Munich (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Technical University of Munich cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

E15 Group

Technical University of Munich
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.