Comparison Overview
Dynalectric Oregon

Dynalectric Oregon
2225 NW 20th Ave, Portland, Oregon, 97209, US
Last Update: 28/03/2026
The Oregon division of Dynalectric Company (Dynalectric Oregon) has served the specialized electrical needs of the Pacific Northwest for decades. In that time, we have consistently maintained a local and personalized focus while growing into one of the foremost electric...

PCL Construction
9915-56th Avenue, Edmonton, Alberta, CA, T6E 5L7
Last Update: 16/09/2026
PCL is a group of independent construction companies that carries out work across Canada, the United States, the Caribbean, and in Australia. These diverse operations in the civil infrastructure, heavy industrial, and buildings markets are supported by a strategic prese...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Dynalectric Oregon







PCL Construction






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Dynalectric Oregon in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PCL Construction in 2026.
Incident History - Dynalectric Oregon (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Dynalectric Oregon cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PCL Construction (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PCL Construction cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Dynalectric Oregon

PCL Construction
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.