Comparison Overview
Deutsche Telekom Services Europe - Czech Republic

Deutsche Telekom Services Europe - Czech Republic
Holandská 859/3, Brno, 639 00, CZ
Last Update: 24/02/2026
Our journey starts from Cologne in Germany, where our mother company subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom Services Europe SE is located. After years of continuous growth, we became a fully European company. Deutsche Telekom Services Europe, also shortly named DTSE, reached a ...

VFS Global
Unit 201, Level 2, Gate Village 8, DIFC, P.O. Box 114100, Dubai, AE
Last Update: 29/03/2026
As the global leader in trusted technology services, empowering secure mobility for governments and citizens, VFS Global embraces technological innovation including Generative AI to support governments and diplomatic missions worldwide. VFS Global continuously transform...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Deutsche Telekom Services Europe - Czech Republic







VFS Global






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Outsourcing and Offshoring Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Deutsche Telekom Services Europe - Czech Republic in 2026.
Incidents vs Outsourcing and Offshoring Consulting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VFS Global in 2026.
Incident History - Deutsche Telekom Services Europe - Czech Republic (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Deutsche Telekom Services Europe - Czech Republic cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - VFS Global (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VFS Global cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Deutsche Telekom Services Europe - Czech Republic

VFS Global
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Fides is an open-source privacy engineering platform. From version 2.33.0 to before version 2.84.5, there is a DOM-based XSS vulnerability in fides.js via the fides_description override. This issue has been patched in version 2.84.5.
WACRM prior to commit 73041bf contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the automation engine that allows authenticated attackers to access and modify contacts belonging to other tenants by supplying an arbitrary caller-controlled contact_id in the POST request body without tenant ownership verification. Attackers can exploit the service-role client that bypasses row-level security to modify victim contact fields including name, email, and company across tenant boundaries using only a known contact UUID.
Namespace attributes are not encoded correctly during HTML serialization. This allows bypassing the cross-site scripting prevention mechanism of typo3/html-sanitizer before version 2.3.2.
When ALLOW_INSECURE_RAW_TEXT is enabled, whitespace-variant closing tags (e.g., </style\t>) are not recognized by the sanitizer but accepted by browsers as valid end tags, allowing subsequent content to escape sanitization. This allows bypassing the cross-site scripting prevention mechanism of typo3/html-sanitizer before version 2.3.2.
Headplane is a feature-complete Web UI for Headscale. Prior to versions 0.6.3 and 0.7.0-beta.3, Headplane was vulnerable to a path traversal / authorization bypass in the Headscale API client used by node and user rename operations. This issue has been patched in versions 0.6.3 and 0.7.0-beta.3.