Comparison Overview
DOLBIX CONSULTING Inc.

DOLBIX CONSULTING Inc.
日本橋室町2-1-1, 中央区, 東京都, 103-0022, JP
Last Update: 10/12/2025
DOLBIXは、丸紅100%出資のDXコンサルティングファームです。 戦略とDXの知見を持つプロフェッショナルが集結しており、 【1】DXの目的としてのビジネスと、手段であるITの両面でコンサルティングを行い、 【2】丸紅グループの持つ事業資産を活かしたハンズオン支援を行い、 【3】グループ内の社会基盤に関わる事業へのDXコンサルティングの知見をグループ外にも展開することで、 日本のDXを先導します。

WNS
New York, US
Last Update: 08/09/2026
WNS, part of Capgemini, is a global Agentic AI-powered intelligent operations and transformation company. WNS combines deep industry knowledge with technology, analytics, and process expertise to co-create innovative, digitally-led transformational solutions with over 7...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

DOLBIX CONSULTING Inc.







WNS






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DOLBIX CONSULTING Inc. in 2026.
Incidents vs Business Consulting and Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for WNS in 2026.
Incident History - DOLBIX CONSULTING Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DOLBIX CONSULTING Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - WNS (X = Date, Y = Severity)
WNS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

DOLBIX CONSULTING Inc.

WNS
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.