Comparison Overview
Defence Australia

Defence Australia
17 Sir Thomas Blamey Sq, Russell, 2600, AU
Last Update: 29/01/2026
The Department of Defence is responsible for defending Australia and its national interests. By growing local and international Defence partnerships and investing in the Defence Industry to develop and deliver innovative, cutting-edge capabilities, the department promot...

L3 Technologies
600 Third Ave, New York, 10016, US
Last Update: 30/03/2026
With headquarters in New York City and approximately 31,000 employees worldwide, L3 develops advanced defense technologies and commercial solutions in pilot training, aviation security, night vision and EO/IR, weapons, maritime systems and space. The company reported 20...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Defence Australia







L3 Technologies






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Defence Australia in 2026.
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for L3 Technologies in 2026.
Incident History - Defence Australia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Defence Australia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - L3 Technologies (X = Date, Y = Severity)
L3 Technologies cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Defence Australia

L3 Technologies
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.