Comparison Overview
DeepL

DeepL
Maarweg 165, Cologne, North Rhine-Westphalia, DE, 50825
Last Update: 10/03/2026
DeepL is a global communications platform powered by Language AI. Since 2017, we’ve been on a mission to break down language barriers. Our human-sounding translations and intelligent writing suggestions are designed with enterprise security in mind. Today, they enable ...

IGT
6355 S Buffalo Dr, Las Vegas, NV, US, 89113
Last Update: 07/09/2026
IGT is a leading global provider of gaming, digital and financial technology solutions, formed through the combination of International Game Technology PLC’s Gaming & Digital Business and Everi Holdings Inc. IGT’s offering spans gaming machines, game content and systems...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

DeepL







IGT






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DeepL in 2026.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IGT in 2026.
Incident History - DeepL (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DeepL cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - IGT (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IGT cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

DeepL

IGT
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.