Comparison Overview
Davidson Benefits Planning, an Alera Group Company
Davidson Benefits Planning, an Alera Group Company
7632 SW Durham Road, Suite 115, Tigard, 97224, US
Last Update: 06/05/2026
Davidson Benefits Planning was formed in 1983 and was acquired by Alera Group in 2018. We offer a wide range of expertise to employers in the creation and maintenance of a full complement of employee benefit programs. We focus 100% of our efforts and resources on group...
QBE Insurance
388 George Street, Sydney, New South Wales, AU, 2000
Last Update: 19/05/2026
At QBE we’re driven by our purpose of enabling a more resilient future. QBE is an international insurer and reinsurer headquartered in Sydney, Australia, with local presence in 26 countries. We don't just see ourselves as an insurer, but a partner to our customers i...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Davidson Benefits Planning, an Alera Group Company
QBE Insurance
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Davidson Benefits Planning, an Alera Group Company in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for QBE Insurance in 2026.
Incident History - Davidson Benefits Planning, an Alera Group Company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Davidson Benefits Planning, an Alera Group Company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - QBE Insurance (X = Date, Y = Severity)
QBE Insurance cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Davidson Benefits Planning, an Alera Group Company
QBE Insurance
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.