Comparison Overview
Dana TM4

Dana TM4
135 Rue J.-A.-Bombardier, Boucherville, Québec, J4B 8P1, CA
Last Update: 26/04/2026
Dana TM4 is a joint venture between Dana Incorporated and Hydro-Québec. The company designs and manufactures low- to high-voltage electric motors, generators, inverters and control systems suitable for the automotive, commercial, off-highway, marine, rail, motorsports, ...

General Motors
100 Renaissance Center, Detroit, 48243, US
Last Update: 11/09/2026
General Motors’ vision is to create a world with Zero Crashes, Zero Emissions and Zero Congestion, and we have committed ourselves to leading the way toward this future. Today, we are in the midst of a transportation revolution, and we have the ambition, the talent and ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Dana TM4







General Motors






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Dana TM4 in 2026.
Incidents vs Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
General Motors has 191.26% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Dana TM4 (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Dana TM4 cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - General Motors (X = Date, Y = Severity)
General Motors cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Dana TM4

General Motors
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.