Comparison Overview
Dalkia Air Solutions

Dalkia Air Solutions
1132, Rue de la Castelle, Montpellier, Occitanie, 34070, FR
Last Update: 24/12/2025
Dalkia Air Solutions, votre partenaire pour une énergie responsable. Dalkia Air Solutions, filiale de spécialité air comprimé de DALKIA groupe EDF, vous accompagne au quotidien pour valoriser votre énergie. Spécialiste dans les domaines de la production, du traitement...

FLSmidth
Vigerslev Allé 77, Copenhagen, Valby, DK, DK-2500
Last Update: 01/04/2026
FLSmidth is a full flowsheet technology and service supplier to the global mining industry. We enable our customers to improve performance, lower operating costs and reduce environmental impact. MissionZero is our sustainability ambition towards zero emissions in mining...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Dalkia Air Solutions







FLSmidth






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Dalkia Air Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for FLSmidth in 2026.
Incident History - Dalkia Air Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Dalkia Air Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - FLSmidth (X = Date, Y = Severity)
FLSmidth cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Dalkia Air Solutions

FLSmidth
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.