Comparison Overview
CPB Contractors

CPB Contractors
177 Pacific Highway, North Sydney, NSW, 2060, AU
Last Update: 06/11/2025
CPB Contractors is a leading major contractor, trusted to build critical and complex infrastructure across Australia and New Zealand for a more connected, sustainable future. We’re solutions-focused and put our people’s safety first. Working collaboratively with our del...

Burns & McDonnell
9400 Ward Pkwy, Kansas City, 64114, US
Last Update: 21/09/2026
At Burns & McDonnell, our engineers, construction professionals, architects, planners, technologists and scientists do more than plan, design and construct. With a mission unchanged since 1898 — make our clients successful — we partner with you on the toughest challenge...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

CPB Contractors







Burns & McDonnell






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for CPB Contractors in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Burns & McDonnell in 2026.
Incident History - CPB Contractors (X = Date, Y = Severity)
CPB Contractors cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Burns & McDonnell (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Burns & McDonnell cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

CPB Contractors

Burns & McDonnell
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.