On September 5th, 2019, COSCO Shipping—a major Chinese state-owned shipping conglomerate—faced a GPS spoofing attack targeting its oil tanker, Jin Nui Zou, at the Port of Dalian. The attack manipulated the vessel’s Automatic Identification System (AIS), causing erratic position data, including false high-speed movements and a final 'crop circle' pattern centered on land within the oil terminal. This incident was part of a broader campaign affecting 20+ Chinese coastal sites, likely a countermeasure against U.S. sanctions on Iranian crude imports. The spoofing disrupted 9 oil terminals across two terminal areas, risking navigational safety, operational integrity, and potential collisions or groundings due to false positioning. While no direct data breach or ransomware was involved, the attack undermined maritime cybersecurity, exposed vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, and posed risks to global supply chains—particularly for energy transport. The incident highlighted how state-aligned cyber operations could weaponize GPS spoofing to evade sanctions enforcement, with broader implications for geopolitical tensions and economic stability in the region.