Comparison Overview
Coregas Pty Ltd - a Wesfarmers company

Coregas Pty Ltd - a Wesfarmers company
66 Loftus Road, Sydney, New South Wales, 2161, AU
Last Update: 26/10/2025
As a Wesfarmers company, Coregas is the largest Australian-owned gases company. We service a huge range of industries and have a wealth of experience and knowledge spanning over 40 years. We manufacture gases locally and distribute throughout Australia and New Zealand...

SABIC
PO Box 5101, Riyadh, SA, 11422
Last Update: 29/07/2026
SABIC is a global leader in chemicals headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. From making cars and planes more fuel-efficient, to helping conserve the world’s water supply and enabling colorful smartphone cases, we find solutions to the challenges of today to help our cu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Coregas Pty Ltd - a Wesfarmers company







SABIC






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Chemical Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Coregas Pty Ltd - a Wesfarmers company in 2026.
Incidents vs Chemical Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for SABIC in 2026.
Incident History - Coregas Pty Ltd - a Wesfarmers company (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Coregas Pty Ltd - a Wesfarmers company cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - SABIC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
SABIC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Coregas Pty Ltd - a Wesfarmers company

SABIC
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.