Comparison Overview
CORE Foodservice

CORE Foodservice
6651 Gate Pkwy, None, Jacksonville, Florida, US, 32256
Last Update: 06/12/2025
CORE Foodservice accelerates growth everywhere consumers eat away from home. As the most dominant and resourced foodservice agency in the industry, we drive demand across foodservice operators and distributor partners throughout North America. ----- Nous accélérons ...

PRAN-RFL Group
PRAN-RFL Center, 105, Middle Badda, Dhaka, BD, 1212
Last Update: 14/09/2026
PRAN RFL Group, one of the most reputed conglomerates in Bangladesh, is in market since 1981. It started mainly with Foundry business and gradually diversified to Light Engineering, PVC Fittings, Plastics, Food and Beverage and Agro-Processing. It has it's marketing and...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

CORE Foodservice







PRAN-RFL Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for CORE Foodservice in 2026.
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for PRAN-RFL Group in 2026.
Incident History - CORE Foodservice (X = Date, Y = Severity)
CORE Foodservice cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - PRAN-RFL Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
PRAN-RFL Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

CORE Foodservice

PRAN-RFL Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.