Comparison Overview
Continental General

Continental General
11001 Lakeline Blvd, Austin, 78717, US
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Since our founding in 1961, Continental General has been dedicated to serving policyholders, claimants, and their families with reliable insurance solutions. Headquartered in Austin, Texas, our commitment to care and excellence has allowed us to grow into trusted provid...

QBE Insurance
388 George Street, Sydney, New South Wales, AU, 2000
Last Update: 19/05/2026
At QBE we’re driven by our purpose of enabling a more resilient future. QBE is an international insurer and reinsurer headquartered in Sydney, Australia, with local presence in 26 countries. We don't just see ourselves as an insurer, but a partner to our customers i...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Continental General







QBE Insurance






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Continental General in 2026.
Incidents vs Insurance Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for QBE Insurance in 2026.
Incident History - Continental General (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Continental General cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - QBE Insurance (X = Date, Y = Severity)
QBE Insurance cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Continental General

QBE Insurance
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.