Comparison Overview
ESL Steel Limited

ESL Steel Limited
Bokaro, 827001, IN
Last Update: 20/04/2026
ESL Steel Limited is part of the Vedanta group - a globally diversified metals and mining company. ESL was originally incorporated in 2006 as a Public Limited Company. The company has set up a 2.5 MTPA planned capacity Integrated Greenfield Steel Plant near Siyaljori vi...

Dräger
Moislinger Allee 53-55, Lübeck, 23552, DE
Last Update: 09/09/2026
Dräger is an international leader in the fields of medical and safety technology. The family-owned company was founded in Lübeck, Germany, in 1889. The company’s long-term success is based on the four key strengths of its value-driven culture: customer intimacy, profess...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ESL Steel Limited







Dräger






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ESL Steel Limited in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Dräger in 2026.
Incident History - ESL Steel Limited (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ESL Steel Limited cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Dräger (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Dräger cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ESL Steel Limited

Dräger
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.