Comparison Overview
Connect2Hackney

Connect2Hackney
N/A
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Welcome to Connect2Hackney, a council-owned company dedicated to recruiting the Council's temporary agency workforce. We are a 50/50 publicly-owned joint venture between Hackney Council and Commercial Services Group, a company wholly owned by Kent County Council.

Aerotek
7301 Parkway Dr, Hanover, 21076, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
From economic headwinds to talent complexities, the challenges facing North American industry are real. To rise to this moment, Aerotek® Inc. helps companies, and careers evolve. Aerotek provides staffing and services solutions in manufacturing, logistics, constructio...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Connect2Hackney







Aerotek






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Connect2Hackney in 2026.
Incidents vs Staffing and Recruiting Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Aerotek in 2026.
Incident History - Connect2Hackney (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Connect2Hackney cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Aerotek (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Aerotek cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Connect2Hackney

Aerotek
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
GNU Savannah Administration Savane through 3.17 uses untrusted data as part of authorization.
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n113
- https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/administration/savane.git/tree/frontend/php/file.php?h=release-3.17#n123
- https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48605220
- https://www.fsf.org/news/statement-regarding-gnu-savannah-security-reports
- https://www.hacktron.ai
- https://www.mallory.ai/stories/019ee445-bdd4-7775-93b5-a8faaf5c2eb7
AVideo TopMenu plugin through version 26.0 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in menu item rendering due to missing output encoding of icon classes, URLs, and text labels. Attackers can inject malicious JavaScript through unescaped menu item fields that execute for all site visitors, potentially stealing session cookies or performing unauthorized actions.
AVideo through version 25.0 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the decryptMessage.json.php endpoint that allows unauthenticated users to decrypt PGP messages. Remote attackers can submit private keys, ciphertext, and passphrases to perform server-side decryption without credentials, exposing key material to logs and enabling resource exhaustion attacks.
AVideo through 29.0 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the Meet plugin's uploadRecordedVideo.json.php endpoint that derives the target users_id from the uploaded filename without verification. An attacker with knowledge of the Meet shared secret can craft a malicious file upload with a filename containing an arbitrary users_id to invoke passwordless User->login() and establish an authenticated session as any user including admin. Attackers can obtain the Meet shared secret through path-traversal vulnerabilities or timing attacks against checkToken.json.php, then POST a crafted file to uploadRecordedVideo.json.php with a filename like '1-anything.mp4' to hijack admin sessions and gain full account takeover.
AVideo through version 27.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in plugin/Live/test.php that allows authenticated administrators to read arbitrary URLs via the statsURL parameter, which lacks isSSRFSafeURL() validation and accepts requests to private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints. Attackers can exploit this by crafting requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints like 169.254.169.254, and localhost to retrieve sensitive information including IAM credentials, internal service responses, and network configuration details.