Comparison Overview
Alera Group, Formerly Compensation Works

Alera Group, Formerly Compensation Works
Deerfield, US
Last Update: 21/11/2025
As Alera Group, we continue to provide tailored compensation solutions designed to support organizations in today’s dynamic business environment. Our core services remain focused on benchmarking, pay structure development, sales compensation design, executive compensati...

LHH
10151 Deerwood Park Boulevard, Building 200, Suite 400, Jacksonville, Florida, US, 32256
Last Update: 02/04/2026
At LHH, we believe work should be meaningful, fulfilling, and connected. Our vision? To create a beautiful working world—a world where people and businesses are empowered to achieve bold ambitions. That's why we've designed solutions to address each stage of the tal...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Alera Group, Formerly Compensation Works







LHH






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Human Resources Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Alera Group, Formerly Compensation Works in 2026.
Incidents vs Human Resources Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for LHH in 2026.
Incident History - Alera Group, Formerly Compensation Works (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Alera Group, Formerly Compensation Works cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - LHH (X = Date, Y = Severity)
LHH cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Alera Group, Formerly Compensation Works

LHH
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.