Comparison Overview
Commerzbank AG

Commerzbank AG
Kaiserstraße 16, Frankfurt am Main, 60311, DE
Last Update: 04/09/2026
Commerzbank is the leading bank for the German Mittelstand and a strong partner for around 24,000 corporate client groups. In addition, it supports private and small-business customers in Germany with more than €400 billion assets under management. The Bank’s two Busine...

La Banque Postale
115, rue de Sèvres, Paris, FR, Cedex 06 75275
Last Update: 08/09/2026
La Banque Postale is a ‘bank like no other’ driven by the post office values of local presence and service. As heir to La Poste Financial Services, it is the only bank to have been tasked with a mission to provide access to banking services under the law introduced to ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Commerzbank AG







La Banque Postale






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Commerzbank AG in 2026.
Incidents vs Banking Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for La Banque Postale in 2026.
Incident History - Commerzbank AG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Commerzbank AG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - La Banque Postale (X = Date, Y = Severity)
La Banque Postale cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Commerzbank AG

La Banque Postale
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.