Comparison Overview
Commission on Elections - Philippines

Commission on Elections - Philippines
Palacio del Gobernador Bldg., Gen. Luna St., Intramuros, Manila, 1002, PH
Last Update: 31/03/2026
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is the principal government agency tasked by the Constitution to enforce and administer all laws and regulations concerning the conduct of regular and special elections. The COMELEC was created by a 1940 amendment to the 1935 Consti...

IBGE
Av. Franklin Roosevelt, 166, Rio de Janeiro, 20021-120, BR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics or IBGE (Portuguese: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), is the agency responsible for statistical, geographic, cartographic, geodetic and environmental information in Brazil. The IBGE performs a national...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Commission on Elections - Philippines







IBGE






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Commission on Elections - Philippines in 2026.
Incidents vs Government Administration Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for IBGE in 2026.
Incident History - Commission on Elections - Philippines (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Commission on Elections - Philippines cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - IBGE (X = Date, Y = Severity)
IBGE cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Commission on Elections - Philippines

IBGE
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.