Comparison Overview
Colas Solutions (USA)

Colas Solutions (USA)
7374 Main St., Cincinnati, 45244, US
Last Update: 08/03/2026
Colas Solutions™ and the many companies within the Colas Group come from a long history of providing our neighbors the benefits of innovative, long-lasting construction products and preventive maintenance systems. In the early 1920s, two British chemists, Hugh Alan Mack...

Kier Group
Cavendish Place, UK, GB
Last Update: 20/09/2026
Our purpose is to sustainably deliver infrastructure which is vital to the UK. As a leading provider of infrastructure services, construction and property developments, we are committed to delivering for communities and leaving lasting legacies through our work. We are...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Colas Solutions (USA)







Kier Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Colas Solutions (USA) in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Kier Group in 2026.
Incident History - Colas Solutions (USA) (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Colas Solutions (USA) cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Kier Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Kier Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Colas Solutions (USA)

Kier Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.