Comparison Overview
Colas Emulsions

Colas Emulsions
Casablanca, MA
Last Update: 23/01/2026
Colas Emulsions est une filiale du Groupe Colas Maroc, elle gère principalement 2 activités : La fabrication et vente des émulsions et le négoce de bitumes sur le marché national. - Nos principales missions : • Fournir des émulsions pour les chantiers de GTR (Les Gra...

MRV
Av. Prof. Mario Werneck, 621, Belo Horizonte, 30.455-610, BR
Last Update: 16/09/2026
Some 45 years ago, we set out with the ambitious goal of providing affordable housing, working to make Brazilian dreams come true. Over the last few years, we have crafted and shaped our story, becoming a brand-leading platform that offers a variety of housing solutions...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Colas Emulsions







MRV






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Colas Emulsions in 2026.
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for MRV in 2026.
Incident History - Colas Emulsions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Colas Emulsions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - MRV (X = Date, Y = Severity)
MRV cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Colas Emulsions

MRV
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.