Comparison Overview
CMOC Brasil

CMOC Brasil
Rodovia Cônego Domênico Rangoni, km 264,2, Cubatão, São Paulo, BR, 11573-904
Last Update: 04/12/2025
Somos uma indústria que atua na mineração e no beneficiamento de nióbio e fosfatos, minerais essenciais para o progresso da indústria global e crescimento da agricultura no Brasil. Acreditamos e investimos no crescimento sustentável de nossos negócios, por meio da siner...

Tata Steel
Bombay House, 24, Homi Mody Street, Mumbai, 400001, IN
Last Update: 05/04/2026
Tata Steel group is among the top global steel companies with an annual crude steel capacity of 34 million tonnes per annum. It is one of the world's most geographically-diversified steel producers, with operations and commercial presence across the world. The group (ex...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

CMOC Brasil







Tata Steel






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Mining Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for CMOC Brasil in 2026.
Incidents vs Mining Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Tata Steel in 2026.
Incident History - CMOC Brasil (X = Date, Y = Severity)
CMOC Brasil cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Tata Steel (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Tata Steel cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

CMOC Brasil

Tata Steel
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.