Comparison Overview
Cloudy Bay Vineyards

Cloudy Bay Vineyards
N/A
Last Update: 30/01/2026
The Cloudy Bay story is one of adventure, vision and commitment. In 1983 David Hohnen tasted his first Marlborough Sauvignon Blanc. Captivated by its intensity, he began a journey to bottle the essence of Marlborough and share it with the world. David and winemaker Kevi...

Pernod Ricard
5 cour Paul Ricard, Paris, 75008, FR
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Pernod Ricard is a convivial, responsible and successful global wine and spirits group and the #1 premium spirits organisation in the world. The Group represents 240 premium brands available in more than 160 countries. We are 18,500 exceptionally talented people worldwi...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Cloudy Bay Vineyards







Pernod Ricard






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Beverage Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Cloudy Bay Vineyards in 2026.
Incidents vs Beverage Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Pernod Ricard in 2026.
Incident History - Cloudy Bay Vineyards (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Cloudy Bay Vineyards cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Pernod Ricard (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Pernod Ricard cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Cloudy Bay Vineyards

Pernod Ricard
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.